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Essay 
Reflections on the NLRB’s Labor Law Jurisprudence 
after Wilma Liebman 
David L. Gregory,* Ian Hayes,** and Amanda Jaret*** 
 In 2009, South Carolina was blessed to welcome a great American 
company that chose to stay in our country to continue to do business.  
That company was Boeing.  Boeing started a new line for their 787 
Dreamliner, creating 1000 new jobs in South Carolina, giving our 
state a shot in the arm when we truly needed it.  At the same time, they 
expanded their job numbers in Washington State by 2000.  Not a 
single person was hurt by their decision.  Not one.  And what did 
President Obama and his National Labor Relations Board do?  They 
sued this iconic American company.  It was shameful.  And not 
worthy of the promise of America.  But we did one of the things we 
do best in South Carolina.  We got loud!  We’re fighters in South 
Carolina and as we fought we watched an amazing thing happen: you 
fought with us.  And guess what, we won.  A few months ago, I sat on 
the tarmac at the Boeing facility in North Charleston and watched as a 
new, mac daddy plane rolled onto the runway sporting a “Made with 
Pride in South Carolina” decal and surrounded by—get ready for it—
6000 nonunion employees, cheering, smiling, and so proud of what 
they had built.1 
 
* The Dorothy Day Professor of Law and the Executive Director of the Center for Labor and 
Employment Law, St. John’s University School of Law, Queens, New York; J.S.D., 1987, Yale 
Law School. 
** St. John’s University School of Law, J.D. expected 2013; Journal of Civil Rights and 
Economic Development, Notes and Articles Editor; Peggy Browning Fellow; Monsignor Thomas 
J. Darby Memorial Scholar for Excellence in Labor and Employment Law; Junior Fellow of the 
Center for Labor and Employment Law. 
*** St. John’s University School of Law, J.D. expected 2013; St. John’s Law Review, 
Symposium Editor; John Boyd Scholar for Excellence in Labor and Employment Law; Professor 
Lawrence Joseph Scholar for Excellence in Labor and Employment Law; Inaugural Cesar Chavez 
Scholar for Excellence in Labor and Employment Law; Junior Fellow of the Center for Labor and 
Employment Law.  
1. Nikki Haley, Governor of S.C., Remarks at the Republican National Convention (Aug. 28, 
2012), available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/clip/3731656.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 From the National Labor Relations Board’s (“NLRB” or “Board”) 
so-called “September Massacre” in 2007,2 to accusations of the Board’s 
“Marxism on the march”3 during President Obama’s administration, the 
Board has been embroiled in significant political turmoil for over a 
decade.4  Although the Board—the agency tasked with administering 
the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “Act”)5—has, in its 
nearly eighty-year history, frequently been susceptible to shifting 
political winds,6 many commentators have observed that the latest 
cycles of politicization have been particularly potent.7  It is as though 
the cases before the NLRB were relegated to the sidelines, while the 
ideological blood sport of crushing the opposition took center stage.8 
As the 2012 presidential election neared, the NLRB experienced one 
of the most politically turbulent years in its tumultuous history.  Starting 
in late summer 2011, when Wilma Liebman’s courageous tenure as 
Chairwoman of the NLRB ended,9 the Board was thrust under the 
 
2. See Anne Marie Lofaso, The Persistence of Union Repression in an Era of Recognition, 62 
ME. L. REV. 199, 201–02, 225 (2010) (describing the “September Massacre”—the sixty-one 
decisions issued by the Board during September 2007 that substantially eroded protections for 
employees and unions under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)). 
3. See Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board’s Exiting Leader Responds to Critics, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 29, 2011, at B1 [hereinafter Greenhouse, Exiting Leader] (discussing conservative 
politicians’ reactions to the Board’s recent reversals of several decisions made during George W. 
Bush’s administration). 
4. While the Board has been accused of political partiality since its inception, observers have 
recognized greater political tension in the Board’s internal processes and in its interactions with 
the public during the George W. Bush Administration than during earlier periods in its history.  
See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB’s Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. 
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 221, 223 (2005) (discussing the Board’s isolation in its decision-making and 
its partisan operation).  For a discussion of the Board under Obama, see infra Parts I–II 
(discussing the ramification of the Board’s complaint in April 2011 against the Boeing Company 
and the quandaries the Board under Obama faced, including operating as a two-member quorum 
in 2008 and an ethical violation by one of Obama’s January 2012 Board recess appointments). 
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006). 
6. See Brudney, supra note 4, at 223 (“Attacks on Board objectivity were made as early as 
1939 and have continued periodically for more than half a century.  Still, the most recent pattern 
of pro-management decisions is sufficiently striking to warrant further exploration . . . .” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
7. See, e.g., id. (detailing the Board’s recent politicization); Henry H. Drummonds, Beyond the 
Employee Free Choice Act: Unleashing the States in Labor-Management Relations Policy, 19 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 126 (2009) (“The NLRB has become politicized and its 
decisions swing to and fro with the changing political administrations.”). 
8. See generally David L. Gregory, Ian Hayes, & Amanda Jaret, The Labor Law 
Jurisprudence of Wilma Liebman, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. (forthcoming 2012–2013) 
(providing a comprehensive analysis of the case law over the entire course of Liebman’s service 
on the Board). 
9. See Greenhouse, Exiting Leader, supra note 3 (discussing Liebman’s persistent defense of 
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public microscope and became a target for raw, polemical conservative 
attacks.10  This Essay will trace the most recent, post-Liebman history 
of the NLRB, both jurisprudential and political.  Part I of this Essay 
discusses the Board’s infamous 2011 decision to issue a complaint 
alleging that the Boeing Company committed an unfair labor practice 
by transferring work to a non-union facility, and the subsequent 
settlement of the case.  This Essay considers both the doctrinal and 
political ramifications of the Boeing debacle.  Part II evaluates the state 
of the Board after Chairwoman Liebman’s departure and discusses the 
controversy regarding President Obama’s recess appointments to the 
Board.  Part II also briefly discusses the leak of confidential Board 
information by, and subsequent resignation of, Republican Board 
Member Terence Flynn.  Part III assesses the significance and likely 
ramifications of the most recent issues before the Board. 
I. THE BOEING DILEMMA 
The Board’s political dynamics, and the dramatic curtailment of 
crucial employee rights throughout the Bush II administration, spurred 
the Board under the Obama administration to attempt to ameliorate the 
anti-labor effects of many Board decisions.  Although the Board issued 
a number of important decisions during Liebman’s tenure as 
Chairwoman, nothing typifies the highly charged political and legal 
atmosphere surrounding the Board’s recent history more clearly than the 
political firestorm that ignited when the Board issued a complaint 
against the Boeing Company on April 20, 2011.11  When Liebman 
stepped down from her position as Chairwoman on August 27, 2011, 
the Board was steeped in controversy.12  On the positive side, this 
conflict had the potential to settle lingering questions about when 
employers could move business away from a unionized context.  
However, the case settled long before the United States Supreme Court 
 
the Board throughout her time as Chairwoman until giving up the position upon expiration of her 
term). 
10. Michael A. Fletcher, Boeing Case Puts Spotlight on Little-Known NLRB Official, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 5, 2011, http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2016119180_ 
solomon06.html. 
11. Press Release, NLRB, National Labor Relations Board Issues Complaint against Boeing 
Company for Unlawfully Transferring Work to a Non-Union Facility (Apr. 20, 2011),      
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news/national-labor-relations-board-issues-complaint-against-
boeing-company-unlawfully-transferring-. 
12. See Steven Greenhouse, New Rules Seen as Aid to Efforts to Unionize, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
25, 2011, at B1 [hereinafter Greenhouse, New Rules] (discussing the Boeing controversy and 
criticism about the Board’s proposed regulations to expedite unionization elections). 
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could rule on the matter.13 
A. The Boeing Case 
In 2009, Boeing decided to move production of its modern 
Dreamliner planes to a new factory in the right-to-work environment of 
South Carolina.14  This choice surprised the International Association of 
Machinists and Aerospace Workers (“Machinists”), the union that 
represents production workers at Boeing’s facilities in Washington State 
(where the company’s planes have been built for decades).  Taken 
alone, the company’s decision to open a new factory could have been 
within its rights under the NLRA.  Following First National 
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,15 the long-standing interpretation of the 
Act was that a company’s strategic, entrepreneurial decision is distinct 
from the obligation to bargain over the economically motivated  
decision to move business to a non-union setting legal, so long as the 
decision is not motivated by anti-union animus.16  Thus, even if a 
company’s choice to move work is secretly motivated by a desire to 
avoid the power of a union among its employees, it could nevertheless 
dodge Board action by citing legitimate business reasons to transfer the 
work.  If it remains silent regarding the question of a union, the 
employer may simply cast its strategic decision as being at the heart of 
entrepreneurial control and, therefore, not a subject for collective 
bargaining with the union.17  Thus, Boeing’s decision to start 
 
13. Press Release, NLRB, Acting General Counsel Announces Close of Boeing Case (Dec. 9, 
2011) [hereinafter Press Release, Close of Boeing Case], available at http://www.nlrb.gov 
/news/nlrb-acting-general-counsel-announces-close-boeing-case. 
14. Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Tells Boeing New Factory Breaks Law, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 20, 2011, at B1.  South Carolina’s right-to-work law is typical of such laws.  See S.C. CODE 
ANN. tit. 41, § 41-7-30 (2002) (detailing that an employer cannot require employees to join a 
labor organization or agency in order to be or remain employed).  Right-to-work laws prohibit 
employers from requiring employees to join or pay dues or fees to a union as a condition or 
prerequisite for employment.  See, e.g., id. (describing that it is unlawful for an employer to 
require an employee to affiliate, through membership or monetarily, with a labor organization or 
agency).  The NLRA preserves states’ rights to enact such legislation.  See 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) 
(2006) (“Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application 
of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any 
State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial 
law.”).   
15. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).   
16. See First Nat’l Maint. Corp., 452 U.S. at 676 (“Despite the deliberate open-endedness of 
the statutory language [of the NLRA], there is an undeniable limit to the subjects about which 
bargaining must take place . . . .”).  See also Dubuque Packing Co., 303 N.L.R.B. 386 (1991), 
enforced sub nom. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, Local No. 150–A v. NLRB, 
1 F.3d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that the relocation of a plant was a mandatory subject of 
bargaining and that the NLRB’s test for determining this was valid).  
17. See First Nat’l Maint. Corp., 452 U.S. at 680–86 (discussing the balancing of legitimate 
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production in South Carolina might have been valid if it had simply 
announced its decision and carried it out. 
Instead, several Boeing executives made public statements that the 
decision was made to avoid the Machinists’ influence, since the union 
had previously carried out several successful strikes at the company’s 
Washington facilities.18  One Boeing executive told the Seattle Times 
that the “overriding factor . . . was that we can’t afford to have a work 
stoppage every three years.”19  Incensed by what seemed to be an 
arrogant disregard for the rights of unionized workers, the Machinists 
filed a charge with the NLRB, and Acting General Counsel of the 
Board, Lafe Solomon, filed a complaint against the company for anti-
union retaliation.20  Solomon argued that Boeing was moving its 
operations in response to protected strikes by its union workers, thus 
violating labor law.  While the business had other reasons for opening 
its new factory, the executives’ public statements led many to believe 
that the Board’s complaint would result in a definitive statement about 
whether such a nakedly anti-union decision violated the NLRA.21 
B. The Boeing Fallout 
Although the Boeing case eventually settled,22 its ramifications will 
likely continue to cause ripples for two main reasons.  First, although all 
parties involved recognized that it was beneficial to settle the case,23 
there is still a jurisprudential vacuum that may mislead employees and 
employers who face similar conflicts because the courts have given no 
guidance as to the correct balance between employees’ and 
management’s rights in the context of transferring work to non-union 
facilities.  Without a clear statement about the lawfulness of an 
employer’s decision to relocate work under circumstances that suggest 
retaliation against employees who have engaged in concerted, protected 
activity (such as a strike), businesses may be less confident about 
changing the nature of their operations or opening new facilities due to 
a fear that doing so will trigger a federal investigation.  Similarly, 
 
business reasons and mandatory collective bargaining). 
18. Fletcher, supra note 10. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
   21. See, e.g., Editorial, Boeing and the N.L.R.B., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2011, at A24 
(observing that the Boeing case presented an opportunity to resolve “an ambiguity in the nation’s 
labor protections”). 
22. Press Release, Close of Boeing Case, supra note 13. 
23. See Fletcher, supra note 10 (“Solomon . . . wanted to settle the case and had no intention 
of seeing the South Carolina plant shut.  But he said he saw no option other than to file the 
complaint.”). 
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employees may fear retaliation and decline to engage in federally 
protected conduct if they believe their employer can legally relocate its 
operations if it is frustrated by their union activities.  Second, the 
political upheaval and scathing attacks following the Board’s attempt to 
faithfully enforce the Act suggests a new kind of politicization that may 
impede the Board’s ability to adequately defend employees’ rights and 
police unfair labor practices. 
1. Doctrinal Confusion 
The Boeing case exposed a substantial disagreement about the 
Board’s precedent regarding the extent of a company’s right to move its 
operations to another state.24  Despite the political tension that the 
Boeing case generated and the potentially cataclysmic effects of 
pursuing the case upon all parties involved, a definitive Supreme Court 
decision would have substantially clarified most, if not all, of the 
doctrinal confusion in this area of the law.  Meanwhile, it remains 
unclear whether the Board would regard Boeing’s conduct as an unfair 
labor practice.25 
The core of the doctrinal puzzle lies in the appropriate relationship 
between two conflicting, but equally well-supported labor law concepts: 
employees’ rights to engage in concerted protected activity26 and 
employers’ rights to make managerial decisions.27  The Boeing case 
presented a unique combination of facts that made it especially difficult 
to precariously balance, let alone fully harmonize, these competing 
interests. 
From the perspective of Boeing employees in Washington State, the 
transfer of work was clearly in retaliation for their strikes.  In a call to 
 
24. See supra Part I.A (raising the issue of whether the Boeing decision to move production to 
a new factory was in violation of the NLRA). 
25. See Kate Bronfenbrenner, A Good Case against Boeing, WASH. POST (June 22, 2011), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-06-22/opinions/35235600_1_dreamliner-labor-board-
jim-albaugh (describing how plant closing threats are frequently used to deprive employees of 
their statutory right to unionize). 
26. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).  Broadly speaking, concerted protected activity includes many 
types of employee speech or conduct undertaken with the goal of improving terms and conditions 
of employment.  See, e.g., NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17 (1962) (“Indeed, 
concerted activities by employees for the purpose of trying to protect themselves from working 
conditions . . . are unquestionably activities to correct conditions which modern labor-
management legislation treats as too bad to have to be tolerated in a humane and civilized society 
like ours.”). 
27. See First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (applying a balancing test 
between the benefit of bargaining and the burden that such bargaining would place on 
management and holding that an employer’s need to decide to shut down part of its business for 
economically prudent reasons outweighed the benefit of collective bargaining). 
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shareholders, a Boeing executive expressly noted employees’ strikes as 
a motivating factor in the decision to relocate Dreamliner production to 
South Carolina.28  Moreover, the employees would likely have had a 
strong claim that the transfer of work evinced discrimination on the 
basis of their union activity, which would violate section 8(a)(3) of the 
Act.29 
Conversely, Boeing maintained it was justified in transferring the 
work.  The company could have argued that the core of fundamental 
managerial rights that the Supreme Court reserved for employers in 
First National Maintenance shielded its decision.30  However, this 
argument would likely be difficult to defend, given Boeing executives’ 
public statements regarding the employees’ strikes.31 
2. Political Aftermath 
Because the Acting General Counsel issued the complaint against 
Boeing, Liebman shouldered immense political pressure and became the 
personal target for irate pro-business Republicans.32  Republican 
politicians, including South Carolina U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham, 
threatened to block new appointments to cripple the agency.33  Others, 
like Michele Bachmann, a member of the House of Representatives who 
sought the 2012 Republican presidential nomination, vocally vowed to 
shut down the agency if elected.34  Commentators agreed that even in 
the sometimes vituperative political climate in Washington, “[r]arely 
has a federal agency been attacked with as much vitriol as the National 
Labor Relations Board now faces.”35 
Even Liebman herself, no stranger to controversy during her tenure 
as a Member and then Chairwoman of the NLRB,36 reported her 
 
28. Bronfenbrenner, supra note 25. 
29. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). 
30. First Nat’l Maint. Corp., 452 U.S. at 676–77. 
31. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980) (outlining the Board’s methods of 
determining whether an employer had exhibited anti-union animus), enforced 662 F.2d 899 (1st 
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982). 
32. See Greenhouse, Exiting Leader, supra note 3 (describing the reaction of Republicans to 
the Board’s Acting General Counsel’s issuance of the complaint in Boeing).  
33. See Melanie Trottman, Labor Board Races to Make Rulings, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903885604576490422803847328.html (“‘I’m 
going to create a high bar for any future [Board] nominees,’ [Senator] Lindsey Graham said in an 
interview.”). 
34. Greenhouse, Exiting Leader, supra note 3. 
35. Id. 
36. See, e.g., id. (“She said numerous law firms, business associations and partisan groups 
were forever warning about how dangerous the N.L.R.B. was . . . .  She said that as soon as 
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surprise and dismay to the public reaction.  Liebman observed that 
while she knew the Board was “going to have a boxing match,” she 
“didn’t expect [its] opponents to come in with a baseball bat.”37  Acting 
General Counsel Lafe Solomon expressed similar surprise, musing that 
he could not “have possibly predicted that [he] would become part of 
the Republican platform for president.”38 
Yet, Liebman was well prepared to defend the agency against 
external criticism39 after her experience as an often lone voice of dissent 
during the Bush II Administration.40 
II. THE NLRB AFTER WILMA LIEBMAN: QUORUM AND LEAK PROBLEMS 
A. Quorum Problems 
1. New Process Steel and the Two-Member Board 
Congressional inaction and a tumultuous political environment have 
made the Board’s membership a recurring problem.41  Because 
appointing new Board members to fill vacancies is fraught with political 
implications, Congress has preferred to allow the Board to languish 
rather than to allow potentially unfriendly Board members to take 
power.42 
Although the full Board has five members, this political 
brinkmanship left the Board with only two members in early 2008.43  
The Board attempted to continue its operations during this period by 
claiming that two members could operate as a quorum.44  The Supreme 
 
President Obama was elected, such groups began sending out alarmist warnings about all the evil 
the ‘Obama board’ would do.”).  
37. Greenhouse, Exiting Leader, supra note 3 (internal citations omitted). 
38. Fletcher, supra note 10 (internal citations omitted). 
39. See Greenhouse, Exiting Leader, supra note 3 (detailing how Liebman constantly 
defended the Board in her position as Chairwoman). 
40. See generally David L. Gregory et al., supra note 8 (analyzing the case law for the 
duration of Liebman’s service on the Board). 
41. See generally John Sanchez, Two Is Company but Is It a Quorum?, 5 F.I.U. L. REV. 715 
(2010) (discussing and analyzing what constitutes a quorum of the NLRB). 
42. Cf. id. at 715–16 (noting that the Board is typically composed of two Republicans, two 
Democrats, a Chair who belongs to the President’s party, and Board vacancies are common). 
43. See id. (explaining that the appointments of two members expired at the end of 2007); 
Greenhouse, Exiting Leader, supra note 3 (recalling the twenty-six month period beginning in 
2008 when the Board was composed of only two members because members of Congress 
continued to block each other’s appointments). 
44. E.g., Hercules Drawn Steel Corp., 352 N.L.R.B. 53, 53 n.3 (2008) (“Effective midnight 
December 28, 2007, Members Liebman, Schaumber, Kirsanow, and Walsh delegated to Members 
Liebman, Schaumber, and Kirsanow, as a three-member group, all of the Board’s powers in 
anticipation of the expiration of the terms of Members Kirsanow and Walsh on December 31, 
2007.  Pursuant to this delegation, Members Schaumber and Liebman constitute a quorum of the 
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Court disagreed and invalidated nearly 600 decisions that were issued 
by the two-member Board in New Process Steel v. NLRB.45 
When an employer challenged the Board’s authority to issue 
decisions with only two members in New Process Steel, the Supreme 
Court found that the Board did not have quorum power with only two 
members, even if a three-member quorum had authorized such power.46  
The majority opinion relied on the Taft-Hartley Act’s change to a five-
member Board and its requirement of a three-member quorum.47  While 
the Board had interpreted Taft-Hartley to allow a three-member quorum 
to authorize two members of that quorum to continue acting with full 
authority once one of the three left the Board, the Court interpreted the 
statute as requiring the Board to maintain a three-member quorum to 
exercise its authority.48  The Taft-Hartley’s amendments to the NLRA 
require that three members of the Board participate “at all times.”49  
Allowing two members to act with the full authority of the Board, the 
Court held, would undermine the statute’s three-member requirement.50  
Given that Taft-Hartley did not explicitly authorize two members to act 
as a quorum, as Liebman and Schaumber had been acting, it would be 
improper to read such an allowance into the statute’s language.51  
Finally, the Court relied on the fact that the Board had only allowed two 
members to act with full authority in rare cases when one member of a 
three-member quorum had been excused.52  The Supreme Court’s 
holding rendered the 600 decisions made while the Board consisted of 
only Liebman and Schaumber invalid, and established that the Board 
has no decision-making authority without at least a three-member 
quorum.53 
 
three-member group.  As a quorum, they have the authority to issue decisions and orders in unfair 
labor practice and representation cases.” (citing 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2006))). 
45. 130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010). 
46. Id. at 2645. 
47. Id.  See 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2006) (“The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of 
three or more members any or all of the powers which it may itself exercise. . . .  A vacancy in the 
Board shall not impair the right of the remaining members to exercise all of the powers of the 
Board, and three members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of the Board, 
except that two members shall constitute a quorum of any group designated pursuant to the first 
sentence hereof.”). 
48. New Process Steel, 130 S. Ct. at 2640. 
49. Id. (citation omitted). 
50. Id. at 2640–41. 
51. Id. at 2641. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 2645. 
8_GREGORY 3/9/2013  1:38 PM 
932 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  44 
2. Challenges to President Obama’s 2012 Recess Appointments 
In Center for Social Change, Inc. v. NLRB, the Board responded to an 
employer’s challenge to its quorum to render binding decisions.54  The 
employer mounted a constitutional challenge to the Board’s quorum 
pursuant to Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution.55  It 
claimed that the recess appointments of Members Richard Griffin, 
Terence Flynn, and Sharon Block were improper because President 
Obama made them while the Senate was in session, but without seeking 
the advice and consent of the Senate.56  The employer also challenged 
the Acting General Counsel’s appointment, contending that the unfair 
labor practice complaint was issued ultra vires.57 
The Board declined to resolve the merits of the employer’s 
challenges to its quorum.58  Citing its long-standing practice of 
refraining from determining the merits of attacks on the validity of 
presidential appointments, it applied the presumption of regularity of 
the official acts of public officers.59  In subsequent cases, employers 
have continued to challenge the Board’s authority to render decisions, 
but the Board has only cited its previous decision in deference to the 
presumption of regularity.60 
B. Leak Problems 
Republican Member Terence F. Flynn was one of President Obama’s 
January 2012 recess appointments.61  In early May, the NLRB’s 
Inspector General, David P. Berry, determined that Flynn committed 
ethical violations by leaking early drafts of NLRB decisions and 
 
54. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 2012 WL 1064641, at *1 (Mar. 29, 
2012). 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. (noting the Respondent’s argument that the President’s appointment of the Acting 
General Counsel “lapsed on July 31, 2010—40 days after his appointment—because no 
nomination had yet been submitted to the Senate to fill the position of General Counsel pursuant 
to 29 U.S.C. § 153(d)”).  Agency action is “ultra vires” when it is “[u]nauthorized; beyond the 
scope of power allowed or granted by . . . law.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1662 (9th ed. 2009). 
58. Ctr. For Soc. Change, Inc., 2012 WL 1064641, at *1. 
59. Id. (citing Lutheran Home at Moorestown, 334 N.L.R.B. 340, 340–41 (2001)).  
Government agencies’ actions are entitled to a presumption of regularity, which is an assumption 
that all agency proceedings are fair and adequate.  See, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv. v. Gregory, 534 
U.S. 1, 10 (2001). 
60. See, e.g., Coastal Sunbelt Produce, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 135, 2012 WL 4320840, at *2 
n.1 (Sept. 20, 2012) (citing its previous decision in Center for Social Change, Inc.); Nestle-
Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 45, 2012 WL 183147, at *1 n.1 (May 18, 
2012) (also relying on the decision in Center for Social Change, Inc.). 
61. See Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Member Resigns over Leak to G.O.P. Allies, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 28, 2012, at B3. 
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information about the Board’s deliberations to former Chairman Peter 
Schaumber62 and to Peter Kirsanow.63  Flynn resigned shortly thereafter 
despite denying wrongdoing.64 
III. THE BOARD NOW 
Perhaps because of the publicity surrounding the complaint against 
Boeing and its internal politics, the NLRB’s other attempts to protect 
workers’ rights have become points of controversy both before and after 
Liebman’s departure.  The Board’s attempts to modernize decades-old 
rules governing representation elections and notice of workers’ rights 
have been met with indignation among politicians and commentators.65  
At the same time, the Board’s treatment of mandatory arbitration and its 
struggle to adapt the NLRA to twenty-first century technology has 
developed with little mainstream interest. 
A. Notice Postings 
Shortly before Liebman stepped down from her position as 
Chairwoman, the Board issued a set of regulations that required 
employers to display posters in the workplace informing workers of 
their rights under the NLRA.66  The rule would have made an 
employer’s failure to display the notice an automatic Unfair Labor 
Practice under the Act, and allowed the Board to toll the statute of 
limitations for other violations by the same employer.67  The business 
community’s horrified reaction became part of the widespread 
controversy surrounding the Board, and attempts were made to 
extinguish the rule immediately thereafter. 
When the National Association of Manufacturers challenged the rule 
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, the court held 
that the Board had the authority to find that an employer had violated 
workers’ rights under the Act, and that the NLRB had acted with proper 
 
   62. Peter Schaumber was then serving as co-chairman of 2012 presidential candidate Mitt 
Romney’s labor committee.  Id.  
   63. Peter Kirsanow is a former Board member who also served as counsel for the National 
Association of Manufacturers.  Id. 
64. Id. 
   65. See, e.g., William Kilberg, What I Learned Fighting the NLRB, WALL ST. J., July 12, 
2012, at A17 (criticizing the NLRB’s case against Boeing and describing it as an unprecedented 
antibusiness stance); Peter Roff, Obama’s Renegade NLRB Is Disrupting the Recovery, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/peter-
roff/2012/04/20/obamas-renegade-nlrb-is-disrupting-the-economy (arguing that the NLRB has 
been a disruptive force against economic recovery and calling the board a “shill” for unions). 
66. Greenhouse, New Rules, supra note 12, at B1. 
67. See id. (explaining the specifics and rationale of new employer requirements). 
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authority in issuing the rule.68  However, the court also held that the 
Board could not deem an employer’s failure to post the notice an 
automatic violation, and it could not toll the statute of limitations for 
other violations by an employer that fails to post.69  In a similar case a 
month later, the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina 
held that the Board lacked the authority to issue the rule.70  
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
enjoined the rule from being implemented, pending the court’s 
decision.71  The Court of Appeals heard oral argument for the case in 
September 2012.72 
B. Updated Election Rules 
In 2011, the Board also implemented a new procedure for 
representation elections, where employees vote on whether to elect a 
union as their representative in collective bargaining with the 
employer.73  The new procedures were designed to substantially reduce 
the amount of time between the filing of a petition for election with the 
Board and the date of the election.74  The crucial period between a 
petition and election has long been seen as a period in which employers 
are most likely to intensify anti-union campaigns.75  The Board intended 
for the new procedure to lessen such interference with employees’ 
exercise of their right to elect collective bargaining representatives.76 
However, like the Board’s notice-posting rules, court action soon 
halted the new election procedures.  In July 2012, the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia held that the Board did not have 
authority to implement the new election rules because it lacked a 
quorum when it voted to approve the rules.77  The court held that the 
 
68. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 846 F. Supp. 2d 34, 38 (D.D.C. 2012). 
69. Id. 
70. Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 856 F. Supp. 2d 778, 797 (D.S.C. 2012). 
71. Nat’l Ass’n Mfrs. v. NLRB, No. 12-5068, 2012 WL 4328371, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 17, 
2012) (per curiam).  
72. See Abigail Rubenstein, NLRB’s Rulemaking Power Hinges on Union Poster Case, 
LAW360 (Sept. 10, 2012, 10:36 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/376777/nlrb-s-rulemaking-
power-hinges-on-union-poster-case. 
73. See Press Release, NLRB, Board Adopts Amendments to Election Case Procedures (Dec. 
21, 2011), available at https://www.nlrb.gov/news/board-adopts-amendments-election-case-
procedures (announcing the implementation of the procedure). 
74. Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Approves Faster Vote on Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 
2011, at B4. 
   75. See id. (“Unions strongly backed the proposed rules, arguing that lengthy delays gave 
employers too much time to press employees to vote against unionizing.”). 
76. Id. 
77. See Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, Civil Action No. 11-2262 (JEB), 2012 WL 
8_GREGORY 3/9/2013  1:38 PM 
2013] NLRB’s Jurisprudence after Wilma Liebman 935 
Board failed to present timely evidence that Member Hayes voted to 
approve the rule, and that the evidence it eventually presented did not 
establish that Hayes, or one of his authorized staff, had been present for 
the specific vote on the new election rules.78 
C. Collective Action in Legal Claims 
In early 2012, the Board issued a decision holding that companies 
cannot preclude workers from joining together to bring legal claims 
against an employer.79  In D. R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, the employer had 
required employees to sign an agreement that limited their legal 
recourse against the employer to individual arbitration claims.80  In 
other words, employees signed away their right to join in a class action 
suit against the employer or to pursue any other collective legal action 
against the company.81  In its decision, the Board held that the 
employer’s policy stopped workers from exercising their right to 
protected concerted activity under section 7 of the NLRA.82  Thus, the 
employer was ordered to change its policy to allow for such collective 
legal action.83 
With mandatory arbitration provisions widely used by U.S. 
employers,84 the Board’s decision in D. R. Horton could drastically 
change the landscape of labor and employment law.  With the decline of 
unionization in the private sector and the political vacillations of labor 
law, workers are left with fewer means to exercise power against their 
employers.  With D. R. Horton, the NLRB has propped open a door to 
collective action that had been closing steadily.  Yet, given the Court’s 
recent decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion that mandatory 
individual arbitration provisions in cell phone providers’ contracts are 
valid,85 the legal ground beneath D. R. Horton is ripe for challenge. 
 
1664028, at *16 (D.D.C. May 14, 2012).  See also supra Part II.A (describing the political 
difficulty of appointing new board members and how this led to a board with only two members). 
78. See Chamber of Commerce, 2012 WL 1664028, at *15 (“In sum, then, even if Hayes’s 
deputy’s opening the voting task could be taken as Hayes’s participation and subsequent 
abstention, the agency has not shown that this purported abstention occurred prior to publication, 
let alone that Hayes was given a reasonable amount of time to cast a vote.”). 
79. D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, at *1 (Jan. 3, 2012). 
80. Id. at *1. 
81. See Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Backs Workers on Joint Arbitration Cases, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2012, at B1 [hereinafter Greenhouse, Labor Board] (stating that the NLRB held 
that employers could not prevent employees from filing class actions). 
82. D. R. Horton, 2012 WL 36274, at *13. 
83. Id.  
84. See Greenhouse, Labor Board, supra note 81, at B1. 
85. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (rejecting a 
California law declaring class-action waivers in consumer contracts to be unconscionable as 
8_GREGORY 3/9/2013  1:38 PM 
936 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  44 
D. Social Media 
Finally, the application of the NLRA to social media use in the 
workplace has continued to oscillate.  For several years now, the Board 
has wrestled with the question of what activity on social media sites 
should be considered “protected concerted activity” under the Act.86  
Recent cases have centered around two factual contexts: situations 
where employers maintain policies against the use of social media, and 
ones where specific employees have discussed terms and conditions of 
employment on social media sites available to the public.87 
In early 2012, Acting General Counsel Solomon released a 
memorandum outlining recent developments of the application of the 
NLRA to social media.88  While cautioning that the law is in flux, the 
memorandum emphasized two main points.  First, employers cannot 
maintain overly broad policies against the use of social media by their 
workers.89  If employees perceive a social media policy to limit their 
ability to discuss terms and conditions of their employment, it could 
constitute a limitation on their ability to engage in protected concerted 
activity under section 7 of the Act.  Second, employees’ comments on 
social media sites must rise above the level of “mere gripes.”90  
Comments must exhibit some sign of being a part of group activity 
among employees. 
Recently, the Board confirmed both of these general rules while also 
demonstrating the current uncertainty about the law.91  In Knauz BMW, 
the Board held that an employee’s Facebook posting of disparaging 
comments and photos relating to his employer were not considered 
protected concerted activity.92  The employee’s post was not protected 
because it was made “without any discussion with any other employee” 
and “had no connection to any of the employees’ terms and conditions 
 
contrary to, and preempted by, the Federal Arbitration Act). 
   86. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (providing that employees “have the right to self-organization, 
. . . to bargain collectively through representatives of their choosing, and to engage in other 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining”).   
87. See generally Memorandum OM 12-31 from Ann Purcell, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to 
All Reg’l Dirs., Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers, NLRB (Jan. 24, 2012) (describing 
recent cases that fit into these two categories). 
88. Id. at 1. 
89. See id. at 5 (stating that the NLRB “recently held that ‘discipline imposed pursuant to an 
unlawfully overbroad rule violates the Act’” (citation omitted)). 
90. See id. at 7 (stating that in a particular case, the “Charging Party’s Facebook postings were 
merely an expression of an individual gripe”). 
91. See Karl Knauz Motors, Inc. d/b/a Knauz BMW, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, 2012 WL 
4482841, at *1 (Sept. 28, 2012) (affirming both of these general rules). 
92. Id. at *1. 
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of employment.”93  However, the Board also ordered the employer to 
remove its communication policy, which prohibited “‘disrespectful’ 
conduct and ‘language which injures the image or reputation of the 
Dealership.’”94  While Chairman Pearce and Member Block viewed the 
policy as a potential chill on workers’ ability to engage in section 7 
activity, Member Hayes dissented, arguing that the rule was merely a 
codification of common decency.95 
A predictable and coherent application of the NLRA to social media 
is yet to be established.  Other social media cases are pending,96 and 
their outcomes will likely be determined as much by the Board’s 
members’ politics as by the language and meaning of the Act. 
CONCLUSION 
No one is sanguine about the future of the NLRA.  A review of the 
current state of the Board’s politics, and its treatment of important legal 
issues, further fosters an ethos of indeterminacy.  The outcome of the 
2012 presidential election will obviously affect the agency’s course.  If 
Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney had been elected, his 
appointments to the Board would likely have eliminated the new notice 
posting and election process rules, and the application of current Board 
law regarding social media and mandatory arbitration clauses would 
have undoubtedly swung back in favor of business interests.  Even with 
four more years of a Democratic administration under President Obama, 
the future of labor law appears shrouded.  Federal courts will decide the 
fate of notice posting and election rules.  Federal judges will also 
inevitably scrutinize Board cases concerning mandatory arbitration and 
social media, with such important issues eventually reaching the 
Supreme Court. 
Election politics marches on.  During the Republican National 
Convention in 2012, South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley bitterly 
denounced the NLRB for its complaint against Boeing, saying that 
when the company “blessed” her state with a new factory, “President 
Obama and his National Labor Relations Board . . . sued this iconic 
American company.”97  Haley went on to describe how the company 
 
93. Id. at *18. 
94. Id. at *1. 
95. Id. at *1, *5. 
96. Press Release, NLRB, NLRB Finds Facebook Posting that Caused Salesman’s Discharge 
at Chicago-Area BMW Dealership was Not Protected (Oct. 1, 2012), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/news/nlrb-finds-facebook-posting-caused-salesman’s-discharge-chicago-
area-bmw-dealership-was-not-pro. 
97. Haley, supra note 1.  
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won the dispute to thundering cheers.  Public and political opposition to 
the Board will exist for as long as it attempts to enforce and bolster 
workers’ rights.  The agency’s role in labor law will continue to evolve 
throughout the twenty-first century, and with it, the rights of millions of 
workers and their employers. 
 
 
 
